



Susan O'Donnell <susanodo.unb@gmail.com>

A-2022-00099 / KMA - CNSC Access to Information Request - Extension

1 message

Dubuc, Philip <Philip.Dubuc@cnscccsn.gc.ca>

Tue, Jan 17, 2023 at 8:39 AM

To: "susanodo.unb@gmail.com" <susanodo.unb@gmail.com>

Cc: "Khan, Muhammad Atif" <muhhammadatif.khan@cnscccsn.gc.ca>, "general@oic-ci.gc.ca" <general@oic-ci.gc.ca>

Dear Susan O'Donnell,

This is further to your request under the Access to Information Act for:

"Please provide all statements issued between 1977 and 2022 expressing Canada's policy with respect to nuclear weapons proliferation and security risks in relation to plutonium (including but not limited to weapons grade plutonium) and /or on control of the movement and access to plutonium to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and /or security risks, including by rogue actors. "

Pursuant to s. 9(1)(a) of the Access to Information Act (outlined below), an extension of 90 days is required beyond the statutory 30 day limit allowed for the processing of your request. Due to the large number of records involved and a search through archived paper records, meeting the original time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the Department.

You have the right to file a complaint with the Information Commissioner of Canada about this aspect of the processing of your request for a period of 60 days following the receipt of this notice. The address is:

30 Victoria Street
Gatineau, Québec
K1A 1H3

Or online at: <https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/submitting-complaint>

Should you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Muhammad Atif Khan at Muhammad.Atif.Khan@cnscccsn.gc.ca.

Sincerely,

Philip Dubuc

Senior Advisor / Conseiller principal

Access to Information and Privacy /

Accès à l'information et protection d'information personnel

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission /

Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire

Tel.: 613-296-5403

Extension of time limits

9. (1) The head of a government institution may extend the time limit set out in section 7 or subsection 8(1) in respect of a request under this Act for a reasonable period of time, having regard to the circumstances, if

(a) the request is for a large number of records or necessitates a search through a large number of records and meeting the original time limit would unreasonably interfere with the operations of the government institution,

(b) consultations are necessary to comply with the request that cannot reasonably be completed within the original time limit, or

(c) notice of the request is given pursuant to subsection 27(1)

by giving notice of the extension and, in the circumstances set out in paragraph (a) or (b), the length of the extension, to the person who made the request within thirty days after the request is received, which notice shall contain a statement that the person has a right to make a complaint to the Information Commissioner about the extension.



Susan O'Donnell <susanodo.unb@gmail.com>

A-2022-00099 / KMA - CNSC Access to Information Request - Response

1 message

Dubuc, Philip <Philip.Dubuc@cnscccsn.gc.ca>
To: "susanodo.unb@gmail.com" <susanodo.unb@gmail.com>
Cc: "Khan, Muhammad Atif" <muhammadatif.khan@cnscccsn.gc.ca>

Mon, Apr 17, 2023 at 2:43 PM

Dear Susan O'Donnell,

This is in response to your request under the Access to Information Act for:

"Please provide all statements issued between 1977 and 2022 expressing Canada's policy with respect to nuclear weapons proliferation and security risks in relation to plutonium (including but not limited to weapons grade plutonium) and /or on control of the movement and access to plutonium to reduce the risk of nuclear weapons proliferation and /or security risks, including by rogue actors. "

Please find all the accessible records you requested attached. The exemption provision(s) s.19(1) of the Act has/have been applied to the package (outlined below):

19(1) personal information

Please refer to the following website to view these provisions: <https://laws-lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/acts/a-1/>

You have the right to file a complaint with the Information Commissioner of Canada about this aspect of the processing of your request for a period of 60 days following the receipt of this notice. The address is:

30 Victoria Street
Gatineau, Québec
K1A 1H3

Or online at: <https://www.oic-ci.gc.ca/en/submitting-complaint>

Should you have any questions regarding this request, please contact Muhammad Atif Khan at Muhammad.Atif.Khan@cnscccsn.gc.ca.

Sincerely,

Philip Dubuc

Senior Advisor / Conseiller principal

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Accès à l'information et protection d'information personnel

Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission /

Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire

Tel.: 613-296-5403

 **A-2022-00099-KA-Released Package.pdf**
117K

MEDIA CALL SPREADSHEET - - ATIP A-2022-00099 / KMA

September 5, 2014	[REDACTED]	The Canadian Press	[REDACTED]@thecanadianpress.com	<p>Did the uranium that came from the Lorado and Gunnar mills near Uranium City was used for weapons</p> <p><i>Response: The CNSC has no information related to the use of ore from these sites.</i></p>	R. Stenson, D. Howard	Completed August 29	Weapons
March 14, 2013	[REDACTED]	Thomson Reuters	[REDACTED]@thomsonreuters.com	<p>The reporter had the following questions: Q1. How does Canada ensure that its uranium is not used to make weapons, either in Canada or in countries Canada exports uranium to? Q2. Does the Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission regulate the transport of Canadian materials? Q3. Does Canadian nuclear material move mostly by rail, truck, or other means?</p>	L. Chamney, S. Faille	ongoing	Transportation of uranium

March 24, 2014	[REDACTED]	Ottawa Citizen	[REDACTED]@ottawacitizen.com; [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	<p>Can you explain what happened to the exported SNF mentioned in the attachments and its final disposition? Is it possible that plutonium from these shipments of Canadian-origin SNF is among the plutonium that Japan, Italy and Belgium have agreed to hand over to the U.S. today at the Nuclear Security Summit in The Hague?</p> <p>Response: See edoc 4407465</p>	R. Awad	Completed March 24	spent nuclear fuel
March 20, 2014	[REDACTED]	Ottawa Citizen	[REDACTED]@ottawacitizen.com; [REDACTED] [REDACTED]	<p>Is CNSC aware of any Canadian-owned, separated plutonium, either in Canada or held by other parties overseas? Is CNSC aware of any Canadian HEU that was shipped to Britain and/or Italy for reprocessing, resulting in quantities of separated plutonium? If so, does CNSC know what happened to the Pu.</p>	L. Chamney, R. Awad	Completed March 21	Plutonium

				Response: See edoc 4406093			
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ATIP A-2022-00099 / KMA - - CNSC External Website

<https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/non-proliferation/index.cfm>

<http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/international-cooperation/index.cfm>

<https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/news-room/feature-articles/you-asked-us-about-transporting-radioactive-materials.cfm>

[Regulating the packaging and transport of nuclear substances in Canada - Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission](#)

<https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/acts-and-regulations/regulatory-documents/published/html/rd364/>

<https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/mythbusters/index.cfm>

Can be accessed at the following link: <https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/non-proliferation/index.cfm>
<http://www.nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/international-cooperation/index.cfm>

Can be accessed at the following link:
<https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/news-room/feature-articles/you-asked-us-about-transporting-radioactive-materials.cfm>

Can be accessed at the following link: <https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/fact-sheets/packaging-and-transport-of-nuclear-substances.cfm>

Can be accessed at the following link:
<https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/acts-and-regulations/regulatory-documents/published/html/rd364/>

Can be accessed at the following link:
<https://nuclearsafety.gc.ca/eng/resources/mythbusters/index.cfm>

Your initial query inquired about transfers of HEU and plutonium, so we did not include any information on spent nuclear fuel (SNF).

As the documents in your email indicate, small quantities of SNF were transferred abroad from AECL for reprocessing. All material that is transferred to other countries is and remains subject to the respective nuclear cooperation agreements (NCA) in place. All Canadian NCAs require that Canadian-origin material be used for peaceful purposes only and remain under safeguards by the IAEA and its inspection regime.

Pursuant to our NCA with Euratom, the CNSC has been made aware that a quantity of this material (in the form of MOX) is being retransferred from Italy to the USA (Savannah River site) for disposal. Prior to it being rendered no longer usable for nuclear purposes, it will remain subject to the provisions of the Canada-US NCA.

Should any of the material related to the announcements made by the United States at The Hague conference be subject to our NCAs, the CNSC expects the countries in question to request CNSC's consent to retransfer the material to the USA, again pursuant to the provisions of the NCAs in place.

The Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission (CNSC) would like to respond to your March 21 article entitled “U.S. delays armed nuclear waste convoys”. Canadians should rest assured that highly enriched uranium (HEU) on site at Chalk River Laboratories is currently safely and securely managed in accordance with the CNSC’s regulatory requirements.

Contrary to what the article states, HEU did not originate in Canada. It has been shipped to Canada from the United States for use in the production of isotopes, and its by-product, liquid HEU, is being returned to its country of origin.

It is important to note that the decision to repatriate HEU in liquid form to the United States is a bilateral agreement between Canada and the United States and that the return of HEU to the United States will be done safely and in accordance with national and international transportation requirements. This also meets the CNSC’s goal of the three Rs: reduce, reuse and recycle.

Your readers should also be reminded that packages designed for the transport of radioactive material such as HEU are specifically designed and certified by the CNSC to meet international safety requirements. These containers must undergo stringent testing, simulating both normal and hypothetical conditions of transport, including free-drop testing, puncture testing and thermal testing.

Once the CNSC receives an application to transport HEU and staff have confirmed that the shipment meets all requirements, the appropriate licence will be issued. The CNSC would not issue a licence for the proposed activity unless it was safe to do so.

Michael Binder, President
Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission

La Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire (CCSN) tient à répondre à votre article du 21 mars intitulé *U.S. delays armed nuclear waste convoys* [traduction : Les États-Unis retardent les convois armés transportant des déchets nucléaires]. Les Canadiens peuvent être rassurés que l'uranium hautement enrichi (UHE) aux Laboratoires de Chalk River est actuellement géré en toute sécurité, conformément aux exigences réglementaires de la CCSN.

Contrairement aux affirmations dans l'article, l'UHE n'a pas été produit au Canada. Il a plutôt été envoyé ici des États-Unis pour servir à la production d'isotopes, et nous renvoyons maintenant son sous-produit, l'uranium hautement enrichi liquide, vers son pays d'origine.

Il faut noter que la décision de rapatrier l'UHE liquide aux États-Unis a été prise dans le cadre d'une entente bilatérale entre le Canada et les États-Unis, et que l'expédition sera sécuritaire et respectera les exigences nationales et internationales en matière de transport. De plus, le rapatriement vient appuyer l'objectif de la CCSN de réduire, de réutiliser et de recycler.

Vous devriez également rappeler à vos lecteurs que les conteneurs pour le transport de matières radioactives comme l'UHE sont spécialement conçus à cet effet et homologués par la CCSN de façon à respecter les exigences internationales en matière de sûreté. Ces conteneurs font l'objet d'un examen rigoureux au cours duquel sont simulées des conditions de transport normales et hypothétiques, y compris une épreuve de chute libre, une épreuve de perforation et une épreuve thermique.

Après avoir reçu une demande de permis de transport d'UHE, le personnel de la CCSN vérifie que l'envoi est conforme à toutes les exigences. La CCSN délivre ensuite leur permis approprié; elle ne délivrerait pas de permis si l'activité proposée ce n'était pas sécuritaire de le faire.

Michael Binder, président
Commission canadienne de sûreté nucléaire