


You may obtain additional information on the complaint process by visiting the website of the Office of the Information Commissioner at www.oic-ci.gc.ca.

Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact Roch Bertrand at 343-598-3263 or by email at roch.bertrand@international.gc.ca.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in blue ink that reads "Alexandre Drago". The signature is fluid and cursive, with a long horizontal stroke at the end.

Alexandre Drago
Director
Access to Information and Privacy Protection Division

Enclosures: Pages 1 to 63

Fortugno, Caroline -RCL [Elle | She,Her]

From: Prime Minister | Premier Ministre <PM@pm.gc.ca>
Sent: February 19, 2025 11:45 AM
To: [REDACTED]@outlook.com
Cc: Ng, Mary -MINT
Subject: RE: Office of the Prime Minister/Cabinet du premier ministre

Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

On behalf of Prime Minister Justin Trudeau, I would like to acknowledge receipt of your correspondence of February 2, 2025.

Please be assured that your comments have been carefully reviewed. In your correspondence, you raise an issue that falls within the portfolio of the Honourable Mary Ng, Minister of Export Promotion, International Trade and Economic Development. I have therefore taken the liberty of forwarding a copy of your message to the Minister for information and consideration.

Thank you for taking the time to write.

J.P. Vachon
Manager / Gestionnaire
Executive Correspondence Services/Services de la correspondance de la haute direction

----- Original Message -----

Subject/Sujet : International Trade, Export Promotion, Small Business and Economic Development Date : 2025/02/02 10:50:05 AM
First Name/Prénom : [REDACTED] Last Name/Nom : [REDACTED] E-Mail/Adresse électronique : [REDACTED]@outlook.com
Address/Adresse : [REDACTED] City/Ville : [REDACTED] Province : [REDACTED]
Postal Code/Code postal : [REDACTED] Telephone/Téléphone : [REDACTED]
Comments/Commentaires : Will the Canadian Government immediately ban all exports of Canadian uranium to the US? All forms/types of uranium; Raw ore, refined, enriched, enhanced, upgraded, weapons grade, fuel, etc.. Also reject all spent uranium/radioactive products from the US intended for permanent storage in Canada.

s.15(1) - International

s.20(1)(b)


Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: April 22, 2024 3:16 PM
To: Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN; May, Adria -NGA; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN; Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle]; Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle]; Dubien, Deric -BBH; Ward, Ryan -BBH; Basadur, Steven -BBI; Bird, Colin -DTROT -HOM/CDM; Scazighino, Jan -DTROT -TD
Cc: Dubien, Deric -BBH; Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN; Thoppil, Naina -IGN
Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US
Attachments: IGN-5605: Meeting with Centrus on Enrichment and Non-Proliferation

Colleagues,

Thank you Deric for looping us in.

Attaching a report from a discussion we have in IGN with Centrus at the end of February. Apologies, as I should have included at least some of you in this distribution list! We have also since met with the US NNSA, including on this issue,





Best
Tanya

From: Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Monday, April 22, 2024 3:08 PM
To: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN <Angelica.Liao-Moroz@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>; Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Just an FYI....

From: Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>
Sent: April 19, 2024 5:18 PM
To: May, Adria -NGA <Adria.May@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Basadur, Steven -BBI <Steven.Basadur@international.gc.ca>; Bird, Colin -DTROT -HOM/CDM <Colin.Bird@international.gc.ca>; Scazighino, Jan -DTROT -TD <Jan.Scazighino@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Ok, well given that Craig will be off Monday, I will chime in now and let him supplement if needed.

To the central question, are officials aware of Centrus Energy Corp is 
 The answer is yes, some are. There has been at least one trip to Ottawa if not more by Centrus to meet with senior leadership at NRCAN and may have met Minister Wilkinson as well.

s.20(1)(b)

Centrus produces Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) in Piketown, Ohio, and it also produced the first 20 kilograms of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) in 2023. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Centrus is currently the only wholly US owned enrichment facility in the United States. The Urenco Group, a British-German-Dutch, nuclear fuel consortium also operates a uranium enrichment facility in the Southwestern United States.

[REDACTED] Perhaps most importantly, there is a third company, Global Laser Enrichment (GLE) also [REDACTED] Global Laser Enrichment is based in Wilmington, North Carolina with operations in Paducah, Kentucky. Cameco, a Canadian company based in Saskatchewan, currently has a 49% strategic interest in the company [REDACTED]

From: May, Adria -NGA <Adria.May@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Friday, April 19, 2024 4:51 PM

To: Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Bird, Colin -DTROT -HOM/CDM <Colin.Bird@international.gc.ca>; Scazighino, Jan -DTROT -TD <Jan.Scazighino@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Basadur, Steven -BBI <Steven.Basadur@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Hi John, oMINT didn't give a deadline, but when they write I assume they want the reply quickly. That said, we can return to this on Monday and try to get our response together then, perhaps to send something by the end of the day. Does that work?

Have a nice weekend, Adria.

From: Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Friday, April 19, 2024 4:19 PM

To: May, Adria -NGA <Adria.May@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Bird, Colin -DTROT -HOM/CDM <Colin.Bird@international.gc.ca>; Scazighino, Jan -DTROT -TD <Jan.Scazighino@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Basadur, Steven -BBI <Steven.Basadur@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Hi Adria,

What is your deadline?

I have some stuff, but I won't get to it today.

JRB

From: May, Adria -NGA <Adria.May@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Friday, April 19, 2024 2:35 PM
To: Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Bird, Colin -DTROT -HOM/CDM <Colin.Bird@international.gc.ca>; Scazighino, Jan -DTROT -TD <Jan.Scazighino@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Basadur, Steven -BBI <Steven.Basadur@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Colleagues: I'm following up with on the request below from oMINT and wondering if you have any insights?

"oMINT is requesting for more context on Centrus Energy Corp.

OMINT was told that Centrus Energy Corp is 

OMINT is wondering if officials are aware of this and trying to determine next steps."

Grateful for your early reply to add your perspective/awareness of this initiative.

Thank you, Adria.

Adria May

Specialist (Commercial Policy) | Spécialiste (Politique Commerciale)
 U.S. Division | Division des États-Unis
adria.may@international.gc.ca
 Cell : 343-597-0438



Global Affairs
Canada

Affaires mondiales
Canada

From: Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle]
Sent: Friday, April 19, 2024 2:11 PM
To: Soucy, Jennifer -MINT -DLU [Elle | She,Her] <Jennifer.Soucy@international.gc.ca>; Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Carlos -WSHDC -TD [He,Him | Il] <Carlos.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Greig, Corina -WSHDC -TD <Corina.Greig@international.gc.ca>; Miller, Karen -WSHDC -TD <Karen.Miller@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINT-Dept Unit/Unité ministérielle <D-MINT-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy/Politiques <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Reeves, Jordan -BBD <Jordan.Reeves@international.gc.ca>; Starkey, Kate -NGA <Kate.Starkey@international.gc.ca>; *oNGM <D-oNGM@international.gc.ca>; *oNGD <D-oNGD@international.gc.ca>; Levasseur-Rivard, Sacha -NGI (<Sacha.Levasseur-Rivard@international.gc.ca>)
Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

s.20(1)(b)

Hi Jenn,

Thanks for reaching out. NGA will identify the correct lead in WSHDC and B-branch on this question and revert with a coordinated response.

Looping in oNGM and oNGD.

Best,
Caroline

From: Soucy, Jennifer -MINT -DLU [Elle | She,Her] <Jennifer.Soucy@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Friday, April 19, 2024 2:09 PM
To: Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Carlos -WSHDC -TD [He,Him | Il] <Carlos.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Greig, Corina -WSHDC -TD <Corina.Greig@international.gc.ca>; Miller, Karen -WSHDC -TD <Karen.Miller@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; *MINT-Dept Unit/Unité ministérielle <D-MINT-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy/Politiques <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Reeves, Jordan -BBD <Jordan.Reeves@international.gc.ca>
Subject: FW: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Colleagues,

Once again, not sure who should be included in this conversation so do not hesitate to loop in colleagues.

oMINT is requesting for more context on Centrus Energy Corp.

oMINT was told that Centrus Energy Corp is 

oMINT is wondering if officials are aware of this and trying to determine next steps.

Thank you,

Jenn

s.19(1)

s.20(1)(b)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: March 1, 2024 4:57 PM
To: Hulan, Heidi -IFM; Grant, Alison -IGD; 'frederic.beauregardtellier@nrcan-rncan.gc.ca'; 'debbie.scharf@NRCan-RNCan.gc.ca'
Cc: *IFM Advisors; Graham, Mark -IGD; Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN; *IGN; 'Fairchild, Jamie'; 'Kathleen.Prosser@NRCan-RNCan.gc.ca'; 'puiwai.yuen@NRCan-RNCan.gc.ca'; 'colin.hoult@nrcan-rncan.gc.ca'; Bourassa, Pascale; Reinholz, David; 'Allison, Nicole'; Alan.Ho@fin.gc.ca
Subject: IGN-5605: Meeting with Centrus on Enrichment and Non-Proliferation

SUMMARY: On 29 February 2024, IGN Executive Director Angelica Liao-Moroz met with [REDACTED] at Centrus Energy, at his request, to discuss [REDACTED]. The key takeaways from the meeting were:

- Centrus is the only facility currently licensed to produce high assay low enriched uranium (HALEU) outside of Russia.
- Their current work is all under a contract with the US Department of Energy (DOE) stipulating that all material produced goes to DOE, who then allots the material as they choose to their HALEU Consortium (note: Canadian companies are part of this consortium). Therefore, [REDACTED]
- The Centrus facility is a “dual-use” facility, meaning it can produce material for both civilian and military purposes, and is not on the US voluntary offer agreement (VOA) with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), creating non-proliferation challenges for Canada.
- [REDACTED]
- IGN shared that we are meeting with the US in mid-March [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

REPORT: Centrus Energy is a US-based enrichment company that [REDACTED]. Following a meeting earlier in the month with NRCan and IGN/Hinton, [REDACTED] sought a meeting with GAC directly to discuss [REDACTED].

2. The Centrus facility is operating at a site that dates back to the Manhattan project. It has gone through many changes over the years, but has always been connected to the US nuclear weapons program (National Security - Centrus Energy Corp). [REDACTED]

3. IGN/Liao-Moroz affirmed our common interest in strengthening North American fuel supply chains, as pledged by PM Trudeau and President Biden. However, Canada and the US also have well-established joint non-proliferation objectives that we adhere to. She urged consideration of putting the Centrus facility on the US VOA, which would align well with the US’ longstanding practice of separating civilian and military nuclear fuel activities. Canada’s non-proliferation policy would not permit processing of Canadian-origin uranium at the facility unless it was put on the US VOA, thereby making it eligible for IAEA safeguards verification.

s.19(1)

s.20(1)(b)

4.

[Redacted]

[Redacted]

IGN advised of the meeting between Canadian and US officials on March 18 to discuss a number of issues, including this.

[Redacted]

Drafted: IGN/Hinton

Approved: IGN/Liao-Moroz

Tanya Hinton

Senior Advisor and Specialist (Nuclear) | Conseillère Principale et Spécialiste (Nucléaire)

Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division | Direction de la non-prolifération et du désarmement

Mobile: +1 (646) 684-5018

tanya.hinton@international.gc.ca



Government
of Canada

Gouvernement
du Canada

s.15(1) - International

s.20(1)(b)

s.20(1)(c)

s.21(1)(b)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: May, Adria -NGA
Sent: April 24, 2024 9:31 AM
To: Soucy, Jennifer -MINT -DLU [Elle | She,Her]
Cc: *MINT-Dept Unit/Unité ministérielle; *DMT-Policy/Politiques; Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle]; Dubien, Deric -BBH; Ward, Ryan -BBH; Reeves, Jordan -BBD; Starkey, Kate -NGA; *oNGM; *oNGD; Levasseur-Rivard, Sacha -NGI; Hinton, Tanya -IGN; Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN; Grant, Alison -IGD; Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle]; Cronin, Niall -NGB; Vanderloo, Carlos -WSHDC -TD [He,Him | Il]; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN; Greig, Corina -WSHDC -TD; Miller, Karen -WSHDC -TD; Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN
Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US
Attachments: IGN-5605: Meeting with Centrus on Enrichment and Non-Proliferation

Hello Jenn,

Officials within GAC are aware of this, as well as within NRCAN. At GAC, IGN has been in touch with Centrus Energy Corp to discuss [REDACTED]. Please find a report attached from their February 29, 2024, meeting. IGN has also since met with the U.S. National Nuclear Security Administration, including on this issue, [REDACTED].

According to NRCAN's representative at our Embassy in Washington DC, there has been at least one trip to Ottawa, if not more by Centrus to meet with senior leadership at NRCAN.

Background

Centrus produces Low-Enriched Uranium (LEU) in Piketown, Ohio, and it also produced the first 20 kilograms of high-assay low-enriched uranium (HALEU) in 2023. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Centrus is currently the only wholly U.S. owned enrichment facility in the United States. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] GLE is based in Wilmington, North Carolina with operations in Paducah, Kentucky. Cameco, a Canadian company based in Saskatchewan, currently has a 49% strategic interest in the company [REDACTED]

Next steps

Officials will engage NRCAN to determine [REDACTED]

Thank you,

Adria.

Consulted: WSHDC, IGN
Approved: a/NGD/Cronin

s.21(1)(b)

From: Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2024 3:20 PM
To: Soucy, Jennifer -MINT -DLU [Elle | She,Her] <Jennifer.Soucy@international.gc.ca>; Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Carlos -WSHDC -TD [He,Him | Il] <Carlos.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Greig, Corina -WSHDC -TD <Corina.Greig@international.gc.ca>; Miller, Karen -WSHDC -TD <Karen.Miller@international.gc.ca>; May, Adria -NGA <Adria.May@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINT-Dept Unit/Unité ministérielle <D-MINT-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy/Politiques <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Reeves, Jordan -BBD <Jordan.Reeves@international.gc.ca>; Starkey, Kate -NGA <Kate.Starkey@international.gc.ca>; *oNGM <D-oNGM@international.gc.ca>; *oNGD <D-oNGD@international.gc.ca>; Levasseur-Rivard, Sacha -NGI <Sacha.Levasseur-Rivard@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Hi Jenn,

We should have something to you shortly.

Thanks,
Caroline

From: Soucy, Jennifer -MINT -DLU [Elle | She,Her] <Jennifer.Soucy@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, April 23, 2024 3:19 PM
To: Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Carlos -WSHDC -TD [He,Him | Il] <Carlos.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Greig, Corina -WSHDC -TD <Corina.Greig@international.gc.ca>; Miller, Karen -WSHDC -TD <Karen.Miller@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINT-Dept Unit/Unité ministérielle <D-MINT-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy/Politiques <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Reeves, Jordan -BBD <Jordan.Reeves@international.gc.ca>; Starkey, Kate -NGA <Kate.Starkey@international.gc.ca>; *oNGM <D-oNGM@international.gc.ca>; *oNGD <D-oNGD@international.gc.ca>; Levasseur-Rivard, Sacha -NGI <Sacha.Levasseur-Rivard@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Colleagues,

Thank you,

Jenn

From: Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Friday, April 19, 2024 2:11 PM
To: Soucy, Jennifer -MINT -DLU [Elle | She,Her] <Jennifer.Soucy@international.gc.ca>; Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Carlos -WSHDC -TD [He,Him | Il] <Carlos.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Greig,

s.21(1)(b)

Corina -WSHDC -TD <Corina.Greig@international.gc.ca>; Miller, Karen -WSHDC -TD <Karen.Miller@international.gc.ca>
Cc: *MINT-Dept Unit/Unité ministérielle <D-MINT-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy/Politiques <D-DMT-
Policy@international.gc.ca>; Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH
<Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Reeves, Jordan -BBD
<Jordan.Reeves@international.gc.ca>; Starkey, Kate -NGA <Kate.Starkey@international.gc.ca>; *oNGM <D-
oNGM@international.gc.ca>; *oNGD <D-oNGD@international.gc.ca>; Levasseur-Rivard, Sacha -NGI <Sacha.Levasseur-
Rivard@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Hi Jenn,

Thanks for reaching out. NGA will identify the correct lead in WSHDC and B-branch on this question and revert with a coordinated response.

Looping in oNGM and oNGD.

Best,
Caroline

From: Soucy, Jennifer -MINT -DLU [Elle | She,Her] <Jennifer.Soucy@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Friday, April 19, 2024 2:09 PM

To: Barnwell, John -WSHDC -EN <John.Barnwell@international.gc.ca>; Vanderloo, Carlos -WSHDC -TD [He,Him | Il] <Carlos.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; Weichel, Craig -WSHDC -EN <Craig.Weichel@international.gc.ca>; Greig, Corina -WSHDC -TD <Corina.Greig@international.gc.ca>; Miller, Karen -WSHDC -TD <Karen.Miller@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Vanderloo, Caroline -NGA [She,Her | Elle] <Caroline.Vanderloo@international.gc.ca>; *MINT-Dept Unit/Unité ministérielle <D-MINT-Dept-Unit@international.gc.ca>; *DMT-Policy/Politiques <D-DMT-Policy@international.gc.ca>; Pye, Sarah -BBI [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Pye@international.gc.ca>; Dubien, Deric -BBH <Deric.Dubien@international.gc.ca>; Ward, Ryan -BBH <Ryan.Ward@international.gc.ca>; Reeves, Jordan -BBD <Jordan.Reeves@international.gc.ca>

Subject: FW: Centrus Energy Corp Canada US

Colleagues,

Once again, not sure who should be included in this conversation so do not hesitate to loop in colleagues.

oMINT is requesting for more context on Centrus Energy Corp.

oMINT was told that Centrus Energy Corp is 

oMINT is wondering if officials are aware of this and trying to determine next steps.

Thank you,

Jenn

s.20(1)(b)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: May 6, 2024 3:37 PM
To: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]
Attachments: [REDACTED] May 7 2024.pdf

Hi Angelica,

I think it would be important that you attend if it's possible for you to do so. You will be the only in-person participant from GAC and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I worry it would send a pretty negative message if we just sent me virtually, as I've already met them.

They also sent along the deck they will present tomorrow, which I attach here.

Tanya

-----Original Message-----

From: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN <Angelica.Liao-Moroz@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Monday, May 6, 2024 2:47 PM

To: Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>

Subject: [REDACTED]

Hi Tanya - it's really hectic already this week. How critical is it for me to go the [REDACTED] meeting? It's a full 2 hours. Is it an option for you to participate and say you're acting director?

**Pages 12 to / à 25
are withheld pursuant to section
sont retenues en vertu de l'article**

20(1)(b)

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: May 15, 2024 6:00 PM
To: Grant, Alison -IGD; Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN
Cc: Graham, Mark -IGD; Thoppil, Naina -IGN; Barbarie, Daniel -IGN; Gollan, Noah -IGN [He,Him | Il]; Tardif, Eric -IGN; Robertson Baklid, Aiden -IGN [She,Her | Elle]; Breton, Julie -IGN; Mosey, Kirsten -IGN [She,Her | Elle]; Stewart, Robb -IGN [He,Him | Il]; Wiley, Vanessa -IGN [She,Her | Elle]; Young-Stewart, Justin -IGN [He,Him | Il]; Hartery, Lynn -VPERM -GR; Friele, Shawn -VPERM -GR; Veitch, Angela -VPERM -GR [She,Her | Elle]; McGrath, Jodie -WSHDC -GR
Subject: IGN-5714: Workshop on U.S. Legal Framework for Enrichment

Summary: The US National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) was in Ottawa on 18 March 2024 to provide a “workshop” on the US legal and regulatory framework for enrichment exports and discussion a range of other nuclear non-proliferation related issues. The key outcomes were as follows:

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

Report: On 18 March 2024 the United States Department of Energy (National Nuclear Security Administration and Office of Nuclear Energy) met with Global Affairs Canada, Canadian Nuclear Safety Commission and Natural Resources Canada in Ottawa. IGN/Thoppil and Hinton participated for GAC.

2. Enrichment: The US provided a presentation on the US legal and regulatory framework for enrichment and reprocessing exports to explain what the framework is [Redacted]

[Redacted]

[REDACTED]

6. In response to a question from NRCan [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. **Centrus:** IGN advised the US about discussions held with Centrus [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

11. Comment: The meeting was very open and cordial, as always, and provided helpful clarifications on the US laws and regulations around enrichment and reprocessing, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

resulted in solutions to a couple of difficult issues for Canada, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Drafted: IGN/Hinton
Approved: IGN/Thoppil

Tanya Hinton

Senior Advisor and Specialist (Nuclear) | Conseillère Principale et Spécialiste (Nucléaire)
Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division | Direction de la non-prolifération et du désarmement
Mobile: +1 (646) 684-5018
tanya.hinton@international.gc.ca



<mailto:tanya.hinton@international.gc.ca>

<file:///C:/Program%20Files/Outlook%20Signature%20Templates/GAC/Missions
-EN-FR.jpg>

s.20(1)(b)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: May 2, 2024 11:22 AM
To: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN
Subject: FW: Draft note for [REDACTED] roundtable May 7
Attachments: [REDACTED] Roundtable.doc

Angelica,

Please find attached a note for the meeting on Tuesday, with TPs.
Of note, NRCan will be the government lead for the meeting, given the domestic policy is their mandate.

Tanya

Approved: IGN/Thoppil

From: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN <Angelica.Liao-Moroz@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Wednesday, May 1, 2024 5:22 PM
To: Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>
Subject: [REDACTED] roundtable May 7

You're probably already planning this, but could I get some detailed TPs for this roundtable? These should flesh out the considerations we look at [REDACTED] Thanks!

Angelica Liao-Moroz

Executive Director | Directrice exécutive
Non-Proliferation, Disarmament & Space |
Non-prolifération, désarmement et espace
Tel. | Tél.: 613-410-2239
Twitter: @ALiaoMoroz
[Canada's Non-Proliferation, Disarmament & Space Policy](#)



Global Affairs
Canada

Affaires mondiales
Canada

PROTECTED B

[REDACTED] – FEDERAL ROUNDTABLE DISCUSSION

AGENDA

- Introductions (10 minutes)
- Presentation from [REDACTED] (30 to 45 minutes)
- Discussion and Q&A with Federal Partners (30 to 45 minutes)

ISSUE

[REDACTED]

CONTEXT

- NRCan leads on domestic energy policy for Canada, and as such will be the lead for the Government in this discussion.
- There is a 1971 Canadian enrichment policy and subsequent guidelines from 1976 that outline the conditions under which Canada would consider enrichment. These could be applied today to see if now is the right time.
- There is interest from the Canadian nuclear industry in having enrichment capacity in Canada, [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

TALKING POINTS

- Global Affairs Canada is responsible for Canada's nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policies, including engagement in the Nuclear Suppliers Group, and negotiation of Canada's bilateral Nuclear Cooperation Agreements.
- As you know, Canada is a Non-Nuclear Weapon State under the NPT, with an IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreement and additional protocol. We have a strong nuclear industry with a significant number of nuclear exports, ranging from uranium to reactors. As such, we have been a global leader in nuclear non-proliferation for decades, helping to set the export control standards and guidelines and implementing them domestically.
- My team is responsible for bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements [REDACTED]

- [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

Page 31

**is withheld pursuant to section
est retenue en vertu de l'article**

20(1)(b)

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

s.15(1) - International

s.20(1)(b)

s.21(1)(a)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: May 7, 2024 8:26 AM
To: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN
Subject: RE: Draft note for [REDACTED] roundtable May 7

[REDACTED]

The CNSC is not attending this meeting. It will be NRCAN, GAC, ISED, IIC.

Tanya

From: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN <Angelica.Liao-Moroz@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, May 7, 2024 8:16 AM
To: Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Draft note for [REDACTED] roundtable May 7

Thanks. [REDACTED]

On May 7, 2024, at 8:11 AM, Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

[REDACTED]

They have also advised that they will ask each department to speak to their role in nuclear. A few things you could note:

1. GAC is responsible for:
 1. Nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation policy
 2. NPT
 3. Nuclear Cooperation Agreements
 4. IAEA
 5. Export controls, including the Nuclear Suppliers Group

Tanya

s.20(1)(b)

From: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN <Angelica.Liao-Moroz@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Tuesday, May 7, 2024 7:10 AM
To: Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Draft note for [REDACTED] roundtable May 7

If we are asked, how long would the entire process take based on our estimation? Remind me the steps?

On May 2, 2024, at 11:59 AM, Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

[REDACTED]

Tanya

From: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN <Angelica.Liao-Moroz@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Thursday, May 2, 2024 11:52 AM
To: Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>
Subject: Re: Draft note for [REDACTED] roundtable May 7

Thanks Tanya. Re the below, how would that work? [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

1. My team is responsible for bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements and [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

On May 2, 2024, at 11:22 AM, Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca> wrote:

Angelica,

Please find attached a note for the meeting on Tuesday, with TPs. Of note, NRCan will be the government lead for the meeting, given the domestic policy is their mandate.

s.20(1)(b)

Tanya

Approved: IGN/Thoppil

From: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN <Angelica.Liao-Moroz@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Wednesday, May 1, 2024 5:22 PM

To: Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>

Subject: [REDACTED] roundtable May 7

You're probably already planning this, but could I get some detailed TPs for this roundtable? These should flesh out the considerations we look at when [REDACTED]. Thanks!

Angelica Liao-Moroz

Executive Director | Directrice exécutive

Non-Proliferation, Disarmament & Space |

Non-prolifération, désarmement et espace

Tel. | Tél.: 613-410-2239

Twitter: @ALiaoMoroz

[Canada's Non-Proliferation, Disarmament & Space Policy](#)

<image001.jpg>

<[REDACTED] Roundtable.doc>

s.20(1)(b)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: May 31, 2024 2:31 PM
To: Liao-Moroz, Angelica -IGN
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN
Subject: FW: [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] delivrables

Angelica – FYI, the [REDACTED] discussions has caught the attention of DMT.

Tanya

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: Friday, May 31, 2024 2:30 PM
To: Mikhael, Marc -BIS <Marc.Mikhael@international.gc.ca>; Viau, Hélène -EUA <Helene.Viau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Baudson, Karen -EUA <Karen.Baudson@international.gc.ca>; Rouleau, Kimberly -BIS [She,Her | Elle] <Kimberly.Rouleau@international.gc.ca>; Leblanc, Jean-Benoît -BIS <Jean-Benoit.Leb Blanc@international.gc.ca>; Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] delivrables

Thanks for sending this very good summary, Marc. I have just made one correction in red below – it is a

[REDACTED]

Hélène – do let us know how we can help.

Tanya

From: Mikhael, Marc -BIS <Marc.Mikhael@international.gc.ca>
Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2024 12:01 PM
To: Viau, Hélène -EUA <Helene.Viau@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>; Baudson, Karen -EUA <Karen.Baudson@international.gc.ca>; Rouleau, Kimberly -BIS [She,Her | Elle] <Kimberly.Rouleau@international.gc.ca>; Leblanc, Jean-Benoît -BIS <Jean-Benoit.Leb Blanc@international.gc.ca>; Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] delivrables

Hi Hélène,

BIS and IGN were at a recent federal roundtable with [REDACTED] Attached is the deck they used and below is a summary of the proposed project. Happy to support as needed.

--

[REDACTED]

The U.S. Congress has passed legislation to ban imports of Russian uranium., which was formalized with the signing of the Prohibiting Russian Uranium Imports Act (H.R. 1042) into law by President Biden on May 13, 2024. The U.S. also announced \$2.7 billion of funding in its 2024 spending bill and issued a request for proposal (RFP) for enrichment services to help establish a commercial domestic supply of High-Assay Low-Enriched Uranium (HALEU) to fuel a potential fleet of advanced reactors.

On May 7, IIC hosted a federal roundtable with [REDACTED] and government departments including NRCan, GAC and ISED.

From: Leblanc, Jean-Benoît -BIS <Jean-Benoit.LebLANC@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2024 11:54 AM

To: Bourget, Geneviève -DMT <Genevieve.Bourget@international.gc.ca>; Viau, Hélène -EUA <Helene.Viau@international.gc.ca>; Kupa, Jonathon -BIP <Jonathon.Kupa@international.gc.ca>; Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>; Geddes, Sarah -DMT [She,Her | Elle] <Sarah.Geddes@international.gc.ca>

Cc: Poupart, Isabelle -EUD <Isabelle.Poupart@international.gc.ca>; Dubé, Nathalie -BID <Nathalie.Dube@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>; Gagné, Marie -BFM <Marie.Gagne@international.gc.ca>; Davies, Alana -BFM <Alana.Davies@international.gc.ca>; Baudson, Karen -EUA <Karen.Baudson@international.gc.ca>; Mikhael, Marc -BIS <Marc.Mikhael@international.gc.ca>; Rouleau, Kimberly -BIS [She,Her | Elle] <Kimberly.Rouleau@international.gc.ca>

Subject: RE: [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] deliverables

My team will reach out to EUA to support

From: Bourget, Geneviève -DMT <Genevieve.Bourget@international.gc.ca>

Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2024 11:52 AM

To: Viau, Hélène -EUA <Helene.Viau@international.gc.ca>; Kupa, Jonathon -BIP <Jonathon.Kupa@international.gc.ca>; Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>; Geddes, Sarah -DMT [She,Her | Elle]

s.20(1)(b)

<Sarah.Geddes@international.gc.ca>; Leblanc, Jean-Benoît -BIS <Jean-Benoit.Leblanc@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Poupart, Isabelle -EUD <Isabelle.Poupart@international.gc.ca>; Dubé, Nathalie -BID
<Nathalie.Dube@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>; Gagné, Marie -BFM
<Marie.Gagne@international.gc.ca>; Davies, Alana -BFM <Alana.Davies@international.gc.ca>; Baudson, Karen -EUA
<Karen.Baudson@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] delivrables

Looping in Jean-Benoît/BIS.

From: Bourget, Geneviève -DMT
Sent: Thursday, May 30, 2024 11:34 AM
To: Viau, Hélène -EUA <Helene.Viau@international.gc.ca>; Kupi, Jonathon -BIP <Jonathon.Kupi@international.gc.ca>;
Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>; Geddes, Sarah -DMT [She,Her | Elle]
<Sarah.Geddes@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Poupart, Isabelle -EUD <Isabelle.Poupart@international.gc.ca>; Dubé, Nathalie -BID
<Nathalie.Dube@international.gc.ca>; Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>; Gagné, Marie -BFM
<Marie.Gagne@international.gc.ca>; Davies, Alana -BFM <Alana.Davies@international.gc.ca>; Baudson, Karen -EUA
<Karen.Baudson@international.gc.ca>
Subject: [REDACTED] & [REDACTED] delivrables

Bonjour Hélène,
DMT aimerait avoir plus d'information sur les liens entre l'entreprise [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

For awareness, this was raised in DMT's bilateral with Invest in Canada CEO this morning. There would be interest by
[REDACTED]

I am including in the distribution Jonathan/BIP- his team leads on FDI as well Naina/IGN given the nature of this transaction.

Hélène can you kindly coordinate a reply for DMT in consultation with NRCan, BIP and IGN, others where needed for Wednesday June 5th next week?
Please note that I will be away, but Sarah Geddes will cover in my absence.

Merci,
Geneviève

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Dubien, Deric -BBH
Sent: August 8, 2024 1:08 PM
To: Christina.Caouette@NRCan-RNCan.gc.ca
Cc: amitabh.dutt@nrca-rncan.gc.ca; colin.hoult@nrca-rncan.gc.ca; Giguere, Eve -BBH [Elle | She,Her]; Thoppil, Naina -IGN; Hinton, Tanya -IGN; Maalouf, Gaëlle -BBH [She,Her | Elle]; Williams, Ian -BBH
Subject: [Request for input by noon Friday] BFM Meeting with Ontario WSHDC Representative David Paterson on Wednesday, August 14
Importance: High

Hi Christina,

Canada's Chief Trade Commissioner and ADM, Sara Wilshaw, has a meeting scheduled with Ontario's Representative in the U.S. (based in DC) and two staff members from Premier Ford's office on Wed, August 14.

Among the list of topics to discuss is:

- How provinces can enhance the Canada-U.S. trade relationship - particularly given their jurisdictional lead on natural resources development (nuclear energy, critical minerals);

While TEC (exBBH) is consulting with GAC's geographic division, we'd appreciate any background or points that NRCan might want to convey on the importance of the Canadian nuclear sector to the U.S. TEC will feed in on Canadian export capabilities, but NRCan might want to convey messages around nuclear fuels (and anything else relevant).

Grateful for any input you might have by noon tomorrow to Gaëlle Maalouf (copied).

Thanks

Déric

Déric G. Dubien
Director, Export Support (TEC exBBH)
Clean Energy Transition, Cleantech, Infrastructure,
Climate Finance (IBD) & International Financial Institutions (Procurement)
deric.dubien@international.gc.ca
613-799-1753



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délégués commerciaux

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Nuclear Energy Sector

Energy Security – Seek input from NGA for Canada-U.S. angles

With the invasion of Ukraine and the associated energy security concerns, the political landscape of civil nuclear has evolved. Several countries are considering delaying, and even halting, nuclear phase out-plans. The global nuclear market is a highly geopolitical space. Russia has historically played a dominant role in the global nuclear fuel supply chain and has been the only viable commercial supplier of High Assay, Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU), a highly specialized nuclear fuel that is required for several SMR designs. Since 2017, construction has begun on 31 nuclear reactors around the world, with all but 4 being of Russian or Chinese design. Our allies, including the U.S., France and South Korea, have been more active for years and continue to view these opportunities from both a commercial and geopolitical lens. As a function of our abundant uranium reserves, coupled with our considerable capacity throughout the nuclear fuel and technology supply chain, this recalibration presents a significant strategic and economic opportunity for Canada's nuclear supply chain and can further position Canada as a key partner in advancing the energy security objectives of our international partners.

Fed-Prov Collaboration

The Canada Infrastructure Bank provided a \$970 million low-interest loan to OPG for its plans to deploy a GE Hitachi BWRX 300 (a U.S. based technology) – one of the first commercial SMRs in the world. Ontario is now proceeding with planning and licensing for an additional three SMRs at the Darlington site to meet increasing electricity demand and provide more opportunities to grow its nuclear supply chain.

Supply Chain Export Opportunities

The BWRX-300 SMR was selected by Ontario Power Generation (OPG) for deployment at their site in Darlington. As the first country to deploy this technology, Canada could stand to benefit from supply chain opportunities for any additional BWRX-300 deployments, partnering with U.S. companies in third market.

s.21(1)(b)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: January 6, 2025 10:01 AM
To: Brennan, Neil -IGN
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN; Dias, Sonali -IGN
Subject: For approval today if possible - [REDACTED]
Attachments: [REDACTED] 5th Letter addressed to
Minister Joly; 2024 05 29 GAC reply to Mr. Frank N. von Hippel.pdf

Neil,

NRCAN has asked us to [REDACTED] following a meeting she had with Moltex Energy last month.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]. The Moltex design includes not only a reactor but also a facility for the reprocessing of used fuel. ISED provided some money to Moltex a few years ago to help with their research and development. This led to 4 letters to the PM and 1 to MINA from US experts and former government officials raising concerns with Canada supporting reprocessing. I have attached the letter to MINA and her response for reference. It has also raised concerns from civil society in Canada (for example, [Fifty years after Canada's plutonium mishap in India, is history repeating itself? - The Hill Times](#)).

Since then, NRCAN has launched a working group to generate a thorough and well documented internal analysis to support future policies/decisions on reprocessing. They have been clear that this work does not constitute the development of a policy for used fuel reprocessing, rather the documentation of the federal governments efforts to understand the risks and benefits associated with the technology.

[REDACTED]

Hapy to discuss or provide any additional background information you would like.

Tanya

**Pages 41 to / à 42
are withheld pursuant to section
sont retenues en vertu de l'article**

21(1)(b)

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

Vukmirovic, Jovan -RCP

Subject: 5th Letter addressed to Minister Joly

To: Joly, Mélanie -MINA[Melanie.Joly@international.gc.ca]
Cc: Frank N. von Hippel[fvhippel@princeton.edu]; Gordon Edwards[ccnr@web.ca]; Susan O'Donnell[susanodo.ca@gmail.com]
Subject: Canada Government's Promotion of Plutonium Separation
Sent:
From: Frank N. von Hippel

[Letter to Prime Minister Trudeau re Proposed Plutonium Separation from CANDU Spent Fuel, 25May2021.pdf](#)
[Second Letter to Prime Minister Trudeau re Canada's funding of Moltex spent-fuel-reprocessing proposal \(27July2021, final\).pdf](#)
[Third Letter to Prime Minister Trudeau \(24 November 2021 final with typo fixed\).pdf](#)
[Fourth Letter to Prime Minister Trudeau re plutonium separation in Canada \(22Sept2023\).pdf](#)
[Response from Canada Minister of Natural Resources Wilkinson 5Jan2022.pdf](#)
[Response from Canada Minister of Natural Resources O'Regan 13Aug2021.pdf](#)
[Some fuels never learn. US Energy Department returns to costly and risky plutonium separation technology \(FvH BAS Sept. 2022\).pdf](#)

Dear Minister Joly,

Two and a half years ago, a group of high-level US non-proliferation experts wrote the first attached letter of concern to Prime Minister Trudeau about the award of CN\$50 million by the Ministry of Natural Resources to a nuclear startup, Moltex, which proposed to build a reprocessing facility in New Brunswick to separate plutonium from spent CANDU spent fuel to fuel a molten salt reactor that Moltex also proposed to build.

Moltex promoted these projects as the beginning of an industry that would make Canada a hub for the production and export of such plants.

We expressed concern that both Canada and the United States had both forgotten the lesson from their export of a heavy water reactor and reprocessing technology to India in the late 1960s, which provided India with the technologies required to produce and separate plutonium for weapons, ultimately resulting in a nuclearized South Asia. We proposed that Canada do a nonproliferation review of Moltex's proposal.

The Prime minister's office forwarded our letter to the Ministries of Natural Resources and Global Affairs for response. (See the end of this e-mail.)

Moltex responded to our open letter and we critiqued those responses in follow-on letters to Prime Minister Trudeau (also attached).

We also received the attached letters from two successive Ministers of Natural Resources. They indicated their hopes for the Moltex project and reassured us that, if the plants were built, they would be subject to full safety and nonproliferation reviews.

Our view, however, is that the nonproliferation reviews should come before funding the development of potentially proliferating technology and we believe that is in your remit. We wonder therefore why we have not heard from your Ministry?

I must acknowledge that we have similar concerns about a program to promote reprocessing R&D that has been launched by two offices in the US Department of Energy: the Office of Nuclear Energy and the Advanced Projects Research Administration – Energy. We have also written a letter of concern to President Biden’s cabinet and I recently co-authored the attached article in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, which the editors titled, “Some Fuels Never Learn.”

Both the US and Canada are rightly concerned about climate warming, and both have advocates of nuclear as well as renewable energy and energy efficiency. Both governments may be funding nuclear R&D and pilot projects – even economically unpromising ones – to show that they are not biased against nuclear energy. But the Hippocratic Oath says “first do no harm” and, when it comes to funding reprocessing research and development, we are concerned that harm is being done.

I therefore urge that your Ministry not continue to sit on the sidelines of this debate and that you organize a nonproliferation review of proposals to reprocess spent CANDU fuel.

If it might be helpful to you, I could recruit a few of my colleagues with the most relevant expertise for a Zoom discussion with your nonproliferation experts on the above issues.

I am copying two Canadian colleagues who have helped us bring our concerns to the attention of the Canadian public.

Sincerely yours and with best wishes for the holidays,

Frank N. von Hippel

Professor of Public and International Affairs emeritus
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University

(also Assistant Director for National Security, White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, 1993-4)

fvhippel@princeton.edu

Minister
of Foreign Affairs



Ministre
des Affaires étrangères

Ottawa, Canada K1A 0G2

May 29, 2024

Mr. Frank N. von Hippel
Professor of Public and International Affairs emeritus
Program on Science and Global Security
Princeton University
fvhippel@princeton.edu

Dear Professor von Hippel:

Thank you for your correspondence of December 20, 2023, regarding the reprocessing of used nuclear fuel.

The funding provided by Innovation, Science and Economic Development Canada in 2021 to Moltex Energy Ltd was to support the development of two activities: a Stable Salt Reactor–Wasteburner and the Waste To Stable Salt process that seeks to make use of used nuclear fuel to produce energy. The purpose of this funding was to enable the requisite research to form a clear understanding of the proposed technologies.

As Natural Resources Canada colleagues have previously advised, the Government of Canada is closely monitoring the research and development of technologies related to the reprocessing of used fuel in Canada. This is part of the government's efforts to stay fully abreast of the science, benefits and risks associated with potential fuel-cycle technologies.

It is important to underscore that this research and development is conducted with oversight by the International Atomic Energy Agency, pursuant to Canada's obligations under its safeguards agreements, which include an additional protocol. The Government of Canada is committed to a thorough review of all relevant factors related to reprocessing—including safety, security, sustainability and non-proliferation implications—prior to any consideration to deploy such technology in Canada.

.../2

Canada

- 2 -

Canada is a staunch supporter of the international nuclear non-proliferation regime and will continue to uphold its obligations and commitments toward the peaceful uses of nuclear technology. This includes commitments and controls over reprocessing of nuclear materials as per Canada's non-proliferation policy and the bilateral nuclear cooperation agreements that govern our non-proliferation obligations in peaceful nuclear trade.

Global Affairs Canada very much appreciates your engagement and that of your esteemed colleagues on this important matter, which is helping to inform our actions. On November 17, 2023, government officials met with a network of Canadian representatives from civil society and academia, including the two Canadian colleagues copied on your letter, for a useful exchange on perspectives about reprocessing used nuclear fuel in Canada.

Should you wish to arrange a discussion with departmental officials, I invite you to contact Ms. Tanya Hinton, Senior Adviser, Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Division, by email at tanya.hinton@international.gc.ca.

Thank you for writing.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'M. Joly', written in a cursive style.

The Honourable Mélanie Joly, P.C., M.P.

s.21(1)(b)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Brennan, Neil -IGN
Sent: January 7, 2025 8:49 PM
To: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN; Dias, Sonali -IGN
Subject: RE: For approval today if possible - [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

Agree in your approach.

Neil Brennan
Executive Director | Directeur exécutive
Non-proliferation, Disarmament and Space | La non-prolifération, le désarmement et l'espace
Global Affairs Canada | Affaires mondiales Canada
Government of Canada | Gouvernement du Canada
E-mail: neil.brennan@international.gc.ca
Mobile: +1-343-630-2014



From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN <Tanya.Hinton@international.gc.ca>
Sent: January 7, 2025 5:12 PM
To: Brennan, Neil -IGN <Neil.Brennan@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>; Dias, Sonali -IGN <Sonali.Dias@international.gc.ca>
Subject: RE: For approval today if possible - [REDACTED]

Hi Neil

Just a gentle reminder on this one. And to advise that Naina and I spoke about it today and she agrees [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

Thanks
Tanya

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: January 6, 2025 10:01 AM
To: Brennan, Neil -IGN <Neil.Brennan@international.gc.ca>
Cc: Thoppil, Naina -IGN <Naina.Thoppil@international.gc.ca>; Dias, Sonali -IGN <Sonali.Dias@international.gc.ca>
Subject: For approval today if possible - [REDACTED]


Neil,

NRCan has asked us to [REDACTED] following a meeting she had with Moltex Energy last month.

[REDACTED]
[REDACTED] The Moltex design includes not only a reactor but also a facility for the reprocessing of used fuel. ISED

provided some money to Moltex a few years ago to help with their research and development. This led to 4 letters to the PM and 1 to MINA from US experts and former government officials raising concerns with Canada supporting reprocessing. I have attached the letter to MINA and her response for reference. It has also raised concerns from civil society in Canada (for example, [Fifty years after Canada's plutonium mishap in India, is history repeating itself? - The Hill Times](#)).

Since then, NRCAN has launched a working group to generate a thorough and well documented internal analysis to support future policies/decisions on reprocessing. They have been clear that this work does not constitute the development of a policy for used fuel reprocessing, rather the documentation of the federal governments efforts to understand the risks and benefits associated with the technology.



Hapy to discuss or provide any additional background information you would like.

Tanya

s.15(1) - International

s.20(1)(b)

Hinton, Tanya -IGN

From: Hinton, Tanya -IGN
Sent: March 18, 2025 9:19 AM
To: Grant, Alison -IGD
Cc: Graham, Mark -IGD; *IGN; *IGS; *YRA; *ECE-Russia/Ukraine; *EKU; Veitch, Angela -VPERM -GR [She,Her | Elle]; Friele, Shawn -VPERM -GR; Churchill-Smith, Kate -VPERM -GR [She,Her | Elle]; Dubien, Deric -TEC; Cournoyer, Guillaume -TEC; Blanchette, Chantel -TEC [She,Her | Elle]; Lapointe, Régine -OPC -TD [Elle | She,Her]; Martineau, Gaetan -OPC; Gupta, Shamali -OPC [She,Her | Elle]; Baerg, Ryan -OPB [He,Him | Il]; 'colin.hoult@nrcan-rncan.gc.ca'; 'tim.gauthier@NRCan-RNCan.gc.ca'; 'puiwai.yuen@NRCan-RNCan.gc.ca'; Temnikov, Dimitri
Subject: IGN-6143: Report of the G7 Nuclear Energy Working Group, 13 February 2025
Attachments: [Redacted]

Summary

- Canada hosted the second G7 Nuclear Energy Working Group meeting, over a year since the inaugural meeting in December 2023.
- G7+EU participants from foreign affairs and energy ministries came together to share information on agreed workstreams, aimed at identifying ways to reduce reliance on nuclear supply chains from Russia.
- An informative UK presentation (attached) set the scene [Redacted]
- Participants agreed on the value of sharing information [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

Report: On 13 February 2025, the G7 Nuclear Energy Working Group (NEWG) met for the second time, after being launched in December 2023 by Japan, as G7 presidency, and the United States, [Redacted] GAC-IGN Executive Director/Brennan and NRCan DG/Beauregard-Tellier represented Canada. Canada outlined their vision for the group as a place the share information and ideas for collaboration in a procedurally light fashion, with no statements or product development.

2. Sapporo 5: While separate from the work of the NEWG, the “Sapporo 5” (Canada, France, Japan, UK, US) provided updates on efforts to secure global nuclear fuel supply chains, including joint statements at COP28 and the 2024 IAEA General Conference on expanding collective nuclear fuel cycle capacities. Individual updates included Canada’s recent announcement of funding for a backstop for fuel contracts, [Redacted]

3. Workstreams: The group provided updates on the five agreed workstreams, with most interest on the initial presentation by the UK:

- [Redacted]

s.20(1)(b)

- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]
- [Redacted]

5. Next steps: A Chair's summary that will be circulated to NEWG participants and then shared with the G7 Non-Proliferation Directors Group. There was agreement on keeping the NEWG procedurally light and not issuing statements at this time. Canada requested that delegations share views on the utility of a second meeting later in 2025 but has not yet committed.

Comment: [Redacted]

[Redacted]

Drafted: IGN/Hinton
Approved: IGN/Brennan

**Pages 51 to / à 59
are withheld pursuant to section
sont retenues en vertu de l'article**

15(1) - International

**of the Access to Information Act
de la Loi sur l'accès à l'information**

Vukmirovic, Jovan -RCP

From: McGrath, Jodie -WSHDC -GR
Sent: March 11, 2025 11:17 AM
To: Brennan, Neil -IGN; Thoppil, Naina -IGN; Hinton, Tanya -IGN; Hinton, Anthony -WSHDC -GR; Nelson, David -WSHDC -GR; Gorman, Laurie -WSHDC -GR; Laporte, Eric -IGR [He,Him | Il]; Headland, Shannon -IGR [She,Her | Elle]
Subject: Nuclear Proliferation Will Haunt 'America First'

A good article flagged to me by one of my former NSC colleagues. You'll note that Pranay, former NSC Sr Director for Non-pro, has co-written it.



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Bottom of Form

Nuclear Proliferation Will Haunt 'America First'

[Ankit Panda](#), [Vipin Narang](#), and [Pranay Vaddi](#)

March 10, 2025

It is no coincidence that Prime Minister Donald Tusk of Poland [openly raised](#) the possibility that his country may need to arm itself with nuclear weapons. Both major parties in South Korea are doing the same. This is a response to what is happening in Washington, where the Trump administration is renovating America's post-World War II grand strategy, tossing aside hard-built alliances, norms on global trade, and much else. Coercive [tariff threats](#), territorial [expansionist rhetoric](#), and expressions of [trans-national far-right political](#) solidarity are in. Liberal values and support for what American presidents once described as a "[rules-based order](#)" are out. Trump has openly said that allies can no longer reliably count on America, or its nuclear forces, as their ultimate security guarantor. Tusk's willingness to consider a nuclear arsenal should therefore not be surprising. Indeed, other [American allies around the world](#) are considering the same, as well as alternative nuclear-sharing [agreements](#) that once seemed fanciful. This will be the potential price of gutting American extended deterrence commitments, the most successful nonproliferation tool the United States has had for three-quarters of a century.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons, to friend and foe alike, has been a core bipartisan pillar of American foreign policy for decades. Perhaps some Trump administration officials greeted Tusk's announcement warmly. Indeed, it is no secret that President Donald [Trump himself](#) and some of [his prominent advisors](#) have shrugged at the prospect of nuclear proliferation, despite the president's open [discomfort](#) with nuclear weapons and his musings about nuclear disarmament as a part of a deal with [Russia and China](#). To be sure, proliferation to American allies might mean big savings on the peacetime costs of forward deployed troops and avoiding entanglement in crises in far-flung theaters.

However, welcoming more nuclear-armed countries, even if they are friends of the United States, threatens core American interests. Trump's "America First" instincts rely on and relish unrestrained American power and primacy. As such, Trump may find that the longstanding American interest in nonproliferation actually serves his worldview rather than compromises it. Allies with nuclear weapons will complicate America's ability to exercise its power. They're more likely to chart independent, possibly oppositional political and economic policies. And

perhaps counter-intuitively, they might make it more likely that the United States gets dragged into a nuclear crisis or war.

The Real Costs of Nonproliferation to American Power

While U.S. policy makers in the post-Cold War decades focused global nonproliferation attention on countries other than allies — notably India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Iran — the looming shifts in a U.S. grand strategy that may bring America home have, in recent years, put the focus on allies. Until now these allies, including [South Korea](#), [Japan](#), [Germany](#), and [Poland](#), have been able to forswear nuclear weapons because they were ultimately shielded by the American nuclear umbrella.

Early in the Cold War, following the advent of nuclear weapons, the United States did not intuitively grasp the reasons why nuclear proliferation to its friends would harm its interests. It was only in the early 1960s, after [France](#) sought a nuclear weapons capability to assert its [independence](#) from the United States and NATO's nuclear deterrent mission, that Washington began to really introspect on the value of nonproliferation for its own interests.

The United States worked hard during the Cold War to prevent proliferation — not just by its adversaries but also its allies. A combination of security commitments, forward-positioning of U.S. conventional and nuclear weapons, and a lattice-work of dialogues, exercises, and information sharing agreements formed the heart of a U.S. [strategy](#) that “extended” deterrence to what is now more than 30 allies. Rendering this credible was a constant effort for the United States. This was especially true at the height of the Cold War and has become more pertinent recently amid growing threat perceptions in [Europe](#) and [Northeast Asia](#) alike.

This strategy, backed by a large U.S. nuclear arsenal, a flexible nuclear posture, and an explicit political commitment to extend these tools to the defense of Europe, let the allies safely focus on other ventures.

European democracies focused on economic growth and trade and the well-being of their citizens, enabled by U.S. [aid](#). In turn, these actions stimulated the U.S. economy, creating a massive long-term marketplace for U.S. producers. The commitments Washington undertook made nuclear weapons acquisition by allies and partners [unnecessary](#), and rather than pursuing expensive, dangerous nuclear weapons programs, allies [agreed](#) to maintain a non-nuclear status and built wealth instead.

The origins of what became an enduring strategic preference for nonproliferation at the time had little to do with high-minded ideas about liberal internationalism, political solidarity with democracies, or values. It was good for American security interests. The spread of nuclear weapons, U.S. policymakers observed, would only serve to limit America's [freedom of action](#) in the international system and endanger U.S. interests. Simply put: Nuclear proliferation to both allies and adversaries dilutes the privileges of power the United States enjoys.

‘America First’ Needs Nonproliferation

In the contemporary context, this quite literally means that pursuing a grand strategy that seeks to place ‘America First’ at the heart of U.S. statecraft should prize nonproliferation. Most importantly, allied proliferation complicates America's ability to exercise its hard power, limiting the privileges of primacy that Trump so relishes. First, in practical terms, allies today that consider building their own nuclear arsenals need to contend with the strategic and technical barriers to actually doing so. Ukraine, Poland, South Korea, and even Taiwan all would face the potential of an explicit renunciation of U.S. protection or assurances if they chose to pursue nuclear weapons. While some in these states may argue this is today's status quo with the Trump administration's approach to alliances, they would face the problem of vulnerability to attack as they sought to build the bomb. Reprocessing and enrichment facilities will be hardly invulnerable to attack, and their adversaries — Russia, China, and North Korea — will have ample incentive to consider sabotage, conventional air strikes, or worse. Russian, Chinese, or North Korean attempts to kill our proliferation-curious allies to stop them from getting there could drag us into a major conflict, as they would certainly threaten the stability of the global economy and thus American interests. Second, even with friendly countries that might successfully proliferate, the actions they take after acquiring nuclear weapons may force Washington to intervene in crises or wars against its own interests. For instance, an ally may force a U.S. president to step in and prevent dangerous nuclear signaling or use, as has been the case in the past with the United Kingdom, France, and Israel in [1956](#); Israel in [1973](#); and India and Pakistan after [1998](#).

A newly emboldened but still weaker nuclear-armed ally or partner may try to provoke a major U.S. adversary, pulling the United States into a crisis as a mediator, or worse. With more nuclear-armed states, the intersection of crises that may implicate U.S. interests with nuclear weapons uncontrolled by Washington becomes far more likely. In a world of reduced U.S. influence on multiple, skittish new nuclear decision-making centers in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, or elsewhere, states are less likely to consider Washington's opinion before engaging in nuclear threat-making — or use — to address local grievances or right historical wrongs.

This would hardly serve an 'America First' world. The potential for metastasizing nuclear crises assuredly contradict the goal of the "strategic prioritization" that former and incoming officials support.

In addition to diminishing American power, further proliferation anywhere — especially by prosperous, democratic allies of the United States, like South Korea — is likely to beget further proliferation everywhere. While some U.S. officials may be comfortable with a nuclear South Korea, they should ask whether they are comfortable with all that may follow in total — such as Japan, Taiwan, Poland, Saudi Arabia, all supporters of today's nonproliferation regime. Should this dam break, the United States' relative power and influence stands to decline. And Trump's dreams of a denuclearization pact with Russia and China will be completely out of reach in a world where multiple new nuclear aspirants emerge. Keeping 'America First' in that world becomes a lot more challenging. Keeping nuclear use from occurring, and potentially embroiling the United States, an ally, or other economic partner in a conflict, becomes much more unpredictable.

The history of nuclear proliferation suggests that any decisions to shelter or encourage allied proliferation are likely to be permanent. With the exception of South Africa, no other state — not even Ukraine, which never had control over the weapons on its territory — has ever relinquished its nuclear weapons. Despite the remarkable success of the United States in leading nonproliferation efforts worldwide, the proliferation genie does not easily reenter its bottle. The acquisition of nuclear weapons is a lasting mark on international politics, and America's freedom to maneuver, even if by "friendly states."

Compared to these potential costs, the administration should tread carefully as it seeks to revise longstanding compacts with its treaty allies around the world. While Trump reels at the peacetime costs of sustaining forward-deployed conventional forces in Europe and Asia, seeing them as evidence of the United States being taken for a ride, the alternatives could be far more costly to the United States. Unleashing a cascade of nuclear proliferation, or rebuilding American economic strength in the aftermath of nuclear conflicts, would be far more expensive than sustaining the U.S. extended deterrence approach.

The surest way for the "crazy" power of nuclear weapons to boomerang back at the United States — constraining our freedom of action and potentially chain-ganging us into conflicts we seek to avoid — is for Washington to actively dismantle the extended nuclear deterrence architecture it so carefully crafted over three-quarters of a century, which managed to keep new allies from getting the bomb. In addition to reinstalling the software of extended deterrence, in order to prevent allied proliferation, the United States may have to make adjustments to the size or composition of its own deployed nuclear force posture. This will ensure that its hardware remains credible for deterrence, as well as assurance — some degree of vertical proliferation may be necessary to stanch the threat of horizontal proliferation, an oft lost point.

The post-Cold War conflation of nuclear nonproliferation with the so-called liberal order was understandable given the geopolitical context of the 1990s, but for the United States, is largely ahistorical. If Trump wants to pursue a grand strategic project with the goal of keeping 'America First', nuclear nonproliferation — not just by adversaries but also by allies — is an essential pillar.

Ankit Panda is the Stanton senior fellow in the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the host of Thinking the Unthinkable for War on the Rocks.

Vipin Narang is the Frank Stanton professor of nuclear security and political science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He served as acting assistant secretary of defense responsible for nuclear deterrence policy during the Biden administration.

Pranay Vaddi is the senior nuclear fellow at the Center for Nuclear Security Policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. He recently served as President Joe Biden's senior director for arms control, disarmament, and nonproliferation on the National Security Council.

Jodie McGrath

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